The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of Defense or any of its agencies. This document may not be released for open publication until it has been cleared by the appropriate military service or government agency.
INTRODUCTION
There are many "battles" within the joint battlefield framework, some based on geographic areas, others on operational warfighting constructs. Loosely interpreted, the levels of war (strategic, operational and tactical) and specific combat operations (to include maneuver, interdiction and fires) can be used to define "battles." Service responsibility on the joint battlefield can be confusing; each service brings unique capabilities, organizations and doctrine to the fight. It is the responsibility of joint doctrine to accurately portray how each services' organizations are used to efficiently utilize all capabilities.
Service and joint doctrine are not always in concert. The Army separates the battlefield in terms of deep, close and rear operations. FM 100-5 states "deep operations are those directed against enemy forces and functions beyond the close battle" (close operations being those fought by forces in "immediate contact"). Deep operations attack "enemy formations at depth to delay, divert or reduce enemy capabilities and hasten enemy defeat." Joint doctrine does not specifically define "deep" operations, but uses the concept of "simultaneity and depth" in describing the operational art. Commanders achieve depth on the battlefield in both time and space. Joint doctrine defines interdiction as "an action to divert, disrupt, delay, or destroy the enemy's surface military potential before it can be used effectively against friendly forces. Organizational elements are in place to coordinate these allocations. The Theater Air
Control System (TACS) has Army and Air Force sections at the lowest tactical levels to plan and execute the ground commander's intent.
Likewise, that portion of the JFC's interdiction battle outside the SCC's AO has not been a point of contention between the services. Joint doctrine establishes the JFACC as the supported commander for air interdiction, the targets are outside the SCC's AO and, until recently, the SCC did not have the weapons systems to influence that part of the battle.
However, the SCC's deep battle (the Army's deep operations or the joint combat operation of interdiction within surface boundaries) has been the source of great controversy. It is fought in the area beyond subordinate elements' AOs yet within the SCC's boundaries. It is the one area in the conceptual battlefield where all four services' capabilities and interests intersect, and it is the focus of this paper.
This paper will briefly recount important past differences between the Army and Air Force that may explain today's absence of joint targeting doctrine for the SCC's deep battle. It will investigate the specific failings in both Army and joint doctrine in prescribing the functions required to plan and execute the deep battle. The paper then examines the existing Army organization used to command and control the deep battle and its adequacy in conducting these operations. Finally, it proposes the functions and structure for a deep battle cell at SCC level, similar to ones being resourced "out of hide" today by corps and division commanders. The proposed deep battle cell is critical to the success of the one battle that involves the most diverse units and systems on the battlefield and has a significant impact on all other operations: the surface component commander's deep battle.
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Recent agreements by senior Army and Air Force leaders at the December 1996
Joint Warfighter Conference have resolved many of the long-standing command and control issues surrounding the SCC interdiction battle. The Army quotes joint doctrine (specifically JP 3-0) in establishing that the SCC is the supported commander for all operations within his Area of Operation (AO). As such, the SCC is doctrinally responsible for synchronizing all maneuver, fires and interdiction within his boundaries. 4 Additionally, the Army felt that JFACC control of this battle violated the principle of unity of command and resulted in slow planning and attack of targets. The Air Force's position has been that joint doctrine names the JFACC as the supported commander for air interdiction operations. 5 The Air Force also believed that it provided the preponderance of attack assets used by the SCC in the prosecution of his interdiction fight and was the logical choice to control the battle. For a more in-depth discussion of both services' past positions see LTC Skattum's Deep Battle: Who's in Charge?. April, 1996. 6 The results of the December conference provide a clearer picture of the joint battlefield. Both services agreed that the SCC is the supported commander within his AO. and that he should control fires short of the FSCL while the JFACC should be "the maneuver commander beyond the FSCL." He, too, felt the commander holding the most attack assets and control structure in an area should be responsible for the fight. Thus, it seems the popular position within the Air Force was that the JFACC was responsible for controlling the battle beyond the FSCL.
Operation Desert Storm provides perfect examples of how these disagreements were manifested during actual combat operations. The command and control structure was does not address is how the SCC requests or tasks the myriad of assets that could be expected to join the battle but are not assigned in the ATO process.
It is not enough to pass off the ATO process as a substitute for the comprehensive targeting requirements of the deep battle. The ATO process is often not agile enough to reallocate air forces to meet fluid battlefield conditions or changing operational objectives.
Land force commanders risk losing those assets allocated to them if the targets nominated 72 hours earlier are gone at time of execution. JP 3-0 states: "air apportionment assists
JFCs to ensure the weight of the JFACC air effort is consistent with campaign phases and objectives." It may be impossible for a land forces commander to accurately predict changes in the operational phases or he may be presented with opportunities to exploit enemy vulnerabilities by immediately moving to decisive combat. In these instances, the SCC must make timely adjustments to airpower planned in the ATO. Joint doctrine should address how the SCC reorients airpower on targets when target priorities or location change.
Emerging joint doctrine addresses only the attack of "time-sensitive" targets, not the elements or methods required to plan and conduct interdiction operations within the SCC's boundaries. The Air-Land-Sea Applications (ALSA) Center is currently writing the manual for attack of "time-sensitive" targets that will be incorporated into the new Joint Pub 3-60, Targeting, for which the Air Force has the lead. Today's focus on developing doctrine for the engagement of "time-sensitive" targets is understandable; this is the issue that caused the major "rub" between the two services and was resolved at the Joint Warfighters Conference. Joint doctrine writers are striking while the iron is hot.
However, we still need to address how, and through what organizations, the SCC will direct the other services in planning his deep battle. How the SCC synchronizes and employs the many assets from all services remains to be incorporated into the doctrine.
ARMY DOCTRINE
Army doctrine on targeting this battle has just recently been developed and has not been included in joint doctrine. Army doctrine, principally found in FM 6-20-10, Tactics. integration of joint systems, the Army must identify the agencies and methods it will use to request and coordinate those assets. The SCC will be required to request assets held by other component commanders through the JFC. After allocation, he will be required to coordinate those assets at the mission unit level. Whether the Army standardizes the organization and doctrine for a new cell or conducts the deep battle with its existing structure, it must spell out how it determines the SCC's target priorities, what targets will be attacked, how they will be acquired, what systems will be used to attack the targets and then how the battlefield damage assessment (BDA) will be performed.
Army doctrine to support the deep battle has improved over the past few years, and can continue to improve in the future. The BCDs must be manned to perform the duties listed in FM 100-13, TTP must be developed for target deconfliction and attack of "functional targets, and a more complete description of BCD functions needs to be included in joint doctrine. The Army must then develop the organizational structure that will support the SCC as he requests and directs joint and coalition forces in his deep battle.
ORGANIZATIONAL ELEMENTS
The Army does not currently have the organizations in place at echelons above corps (EAC) to effectively plan, synchronize and direct the SCC's deep battle. suggests the need for a Deep Operations Coordination Cell (DOCC) at Corps and below levels. In fact, most corps and divisions pull resources from standing sections to form a DOCC, or similarly named deep battle cell. Only FM 100-7, Decisive Force, talks to the same type organization at EAC level.
The Army is currently in the preliminary stages of developing an action plan and concept for a DOCC at EAC, with fielding as early as 1999. There is a need for a doctrinal element at the SCC level to plan and direct the deep battle. Normally, the SCC will sub-divide his AO (as the JFC did) and assign geographic areas to subordinate commands. The AOs assigned to subordinate commands are drawn to allow the commander to accomplish specific missions and give the unit a large enough area to maneuver in achieving the missions. Again, these subordinate command AOs will probably not encompass the entire SCC AO. The areas outside subordinate commands'
AOs yet still within the SCC's AO is the SCC's responsibility. The need for a cell to control the deep fight continues to grow rapidly. More weapons systems are being fielded by all services to play in the land battle. US Navy doctrine, as expressed in Forward ... From the Sea, has the Navy concentrating on littoral areas. This is being manifested in the development of medium range precision strike weapons designed to support land forces. The Navy is developing its version of the Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) (conveniently named NTACMS) to be fielded on the new arsenal ship. The NTACMS will have a range of 160 nautical miles (NM) and is being fielded to support committed land forces. The Enhanced Range Guided Missile (ERGM) will give land warriors another deep battle tool out to 75 NM. The FASTHAWK and Land Attack Standard Missile are two more systems being developed and fielded on naval platforms that the SCC will be able to employ in his deep battle. 27 Obviously, the Air Force has always "played" in this battle. They'll be more involved in the future. The Air Force has been designated as the proponent for unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) operations in joint operations. The PREDATOR and future UAV variants give the SCC a vastly improved ability to perform the DETECT and ASSESS functions of targeting. Emerging technologies are allowing combat developers to envision armed UAVs that will be capable of loitering in a target area. They will then either track the target or destroy it upon command of the attacker. New sensor fuzed weapons (SFW) capable of attacking multiple targets at stand-off ranges can be effectively used against the large mechanized forces that would typically be included in the SCC's deep battle.
The Army is also getting more involved in developing deep battle attack systems. 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The Army and Air Force now agree on the broad construct for the deep battle. Both agree that the SCC is the supported commander for all operations, to include interdiction, within his AO. Regardless of where the SCC places the FSCL, he must orchestrate all operations on both sides of the line. The doctrine for attack of "time-sensitive" targets is currently being developed and will answer the major issue of past disagreements.
However, there is a glaring need for an element at the SCC level to plan and execute the deep battle, not merely to coordinate fires on fleeting targets of opportunity. Currently, there is no single element that ensures the SCC's deep battle supports or is synchronized with subordinate units' scheme of maneuver.
There is also a corresponding void in joint doctrine that explains how the SCC plans 
